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EXPLOITING PRE-EXISTING BELIEFS 
AHMED E. TAHA* 
ABSTRACT 
Advertisements and product labels for a wide range of consumer and 
investment products have highlighted product characteristics that some 
people erroneously believe make them superior to competitor goods and 
services. This article argues that these advertisements and labels are 
deceptive because they imply that those erroneous beliefs are accurate even 
if they don’t mention the erroneous beliefs. Moreover, these advertisements 
and labels can deceive even those individuals who have no pre-existing 
beliefs regarding the highlighted characteristics. This deception distorts 
purchasing and investing decisions, causing consumers and investors 
financial loss, reduced satisfaction, and sometimes even physical harm. 
Because these advertisements and labels are used for many different 
products, they are regulated by a number of federal agencies, whose 
regulatory approach often requires the advertisement or label to include a 
disclaimer of the erroneous belief. This article examines the effectiveness of 
such disclaimers and other possible regulatory approaches. It argues that 
often a stronger approach is justified: a prohibition against highlighting a 
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During the most recent Super Bowl, a humorous but controversial 
advertisement for Bud Light beer aired for the first time.1 In the 
advertisement, a huge barrel of corn syrup is delivered to the fictional Bud 
Light castle where Bud Light is brewed. However, the delivery is in error 
because, as the Bud Light King states, “We don’t brew Bud Light with corn 
syrup.”2 When informed that Miller Lite is brewed with corn syrup, the king 
leads a party on a long journey to take the corn syrup to the Miller Lite 
castle. Alas, upon arriving, the guard at the entrance of the castle tells them 
that the corn syrup is not Miller Lite’s; the Miller Lite castle already 
received its corn syrup shipment that morning. The guard, however, directs 
the party to the Coors Light castle because Coors Light is also brewed with 
corn syrup. After another long (and perilous) journey, the party reaches the 
Coors Light castle where a guard happily accepts the corn syrup from them 
and says, “To be clear, we brew Coors Light with corn syrup.” The 
advertisement finishes by showing a glass of Bud Light next to the words 
 
1. David Vinjamuri, Bud Light’s Super Bowl Ad: Corn Syrup, Ethics and Mistaken Identity, 
FORBES (Feb. 6, 2019, 4:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidvinjamuri/2019/02/06/bud-lights-
super-bowl-ad-corn-syrup-ethics-and-mistaken-identity/#33a4bc4f3a39 [https://perma.cc/QM7S-YLU 
D]. 
2. The advertisement can be viewed on YouTube. Bud Light, Bud Light – Special Delivery, 












“Brewed with no Corn Syrup,” while a voiceover states, “Bud Light. 
Brewed with no corn syrup.” 
The advertisement’s message is not subtle: unlike its competitors, Bud 
Light is not brewed with corn syrup. Furthermore, the message is 
unquestionably true; Miller Lite and Coors Light are brewed with corn 
syrup, but Bud Light is not.3 Yet, the advertisement is controversial because 
there is no apparent reason why that fact should be relevant to consumers. 
Beer brewed without corn syrup is no healthier than other beer.4 Indeed, 
Anheuser-Busch, the maker of Bud Light, has been accused of using the 
advertisement to exploit an erroneous pre-existing belief possessed by some 
consumers that brewing beer without corn syrup is healthier.5 These 
consumers might be confusing corn syrup with high-fructose corn syrup,6 a 
sweetener that many consumers believe to be unhealthy.7 Indeed, Anheuser-
Busch’s extensive focus-group testing of the advertisement found that 
“consumers generally don’t differentiate between high fructose corn syrup 
and corn syrup, and that it is a major triggering point in choosing brands to 
purchase, particularly among women.”8 In addition, the advertisement is 
likely exploiting the fact that many consumers don’t know that, even if corn 
syrup is used in the fermenting process, it will not be present in the finished 
beer.9  
The controversy over the Bud Light advertising campaign has received 
attention in the national news media,10 and led to at least a postponement of 
a joint marketing campaign planned by four major beer makers aimed at 
 
3. See Saabira Chaudhuri, Bud’s Super Bowl Ad Imperils Beer Alliance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 
2019, at A1. 
4. Mahita Gajanan, Bud Light Took a Stance Against Corn Syrup. But Experts Say That Doesn’t 
Make Beer Better or Healthier, TIME (Feb. 4, 2019, 7:55 PM), http://time.com/5520120/bud-light-corn-
syrup/ [https://perma.cc/65T9-TPWR]. 
5. Vinjamuri, supra note 1.  
6. Id. (Anup Shah, Vice President of Miller Beers, alleged that Budweiser is “trying to confuse 
consumers about the difference between high fructose corn syrup and corn syrup”). 
7. Id. (“It appears . . . that over half of American consumers worry about [high-fructose corn 
syrup] in their diet.”); Chaudhuri, supra note 3, at A1 (“High-fructose corn syrup, used as a sweetener, 
has attracted negative attention for its role in the national obesity epidemic.”). 
8. Surprising Draft Stats from Super Bowl ’19, BEER BUS. DAILY, Feb. 7, 2019 (citing Andy 
Goeler, Anheuser-Busch’s head of marketing for Bud Light). 
9. Chaudhuri, supra note 3, at A1. Anheuser-Busch has argued that other reasons exist for it to 
highlight the fact that Bud Light is brewed using rice instead of corn syrup: “namely that consumers 
may align Bud Light with the ‘farm-to-table’ movement or using a ‘real ingredient versus a syrup.’” 
MillerCoors, LLC, v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., LLC, No. 19-cv-218-wmc, slip op. at 30 n.17 (W.D. Wis. 
May 24, 2019) (order granting preliminary injunction). However, a court recently concluded that this 
argument “seems counter to the weight of the evidence as to [Anheuser-Busch’s] intent that associating 
Miller Lite and Coors Light with corn syrup would motivate consumer’s health concerns with consuming 
corn syrup or worse, high fructose corn syrup.” Id. Section IV.B of the present article discusses possible 
regulatory approaches when consumers have erroneous pre-existing beliefs about a product 
characteristic that is also relevant to consumers for another, legitimate reason. 
10. See, e.g., Chaudhuri, supra note 3; Vinjamuri, supra note 1; Gajanan, supra note 4. 











increasing beer sales overall.11 In addition, MillerCoors, LLC, the maker of 
Miller Lite and Coors Light beers has sued Anheuser-Busch for false 
advertising and for federal trademark dilution.12 Part of the relief sought in 
the suit is a permanent injunction prohibiting Anheuser-Busch from 
disseminating any advertising, packaging, or other promotional materials 
that expressly claim or imply that Coors Light and/or Miller Light “contain 
corn syrup or high-fructose corn syrup; . . . are ‘made with’ or ‘brewed with 
corn syrup’ unless also expressly stating that corn syrup is completely 
converted into alcohol during the brewing process and not present in the 
final products; and/or . . . are inferior to, or taste worse than, Bud Light 
because they are brewed using corn syrup.”13 
Advertisements that take advantage of erroneous pre-existing beliefs are 
not new. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, aluminum emerged as a 
suspected cause of Alzheimer’s disease, resulting in concern about 
consumer products that contained aluminum, such as beverage cans, 
antiperspirants, and antacids.14 Although later research showed such 
concerns were unfounded, the myth that aluminum in consumer products 
can cause Alzheimer’s still exists.15 In the 1990s, Smithkline—the 
manufacturer of Tums antacid—launched a television advertising campaign 
that highlighted that Tums is “aluminum-free” and that competitor products 
(such as Rolaids, Maalox, and Mylanta) contain aluminum.16 The 
advertisement did not mention Alzheimer’s disease nor state any other 
reason why being aluminum-free is desirable. Nevertheless, Smithkline’s 
competitors complained to television networks that the advertisement 
falsely implied that their antacids were harmful.17 In response to these 
complaints, Smithkline ultimately changed the advertisements to remove 
any reference to aluminum.18 
The Bud Light and Tums advertisements are examples of a practice that 
the Federal Trade Commission has called “exploit[ing] preexisting 
beliefs.”19 The present article defines exploiting a pre-existing belief as 
 
11. Chaudhuri, supra note 3, at A1. 
12. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 34–36, MillerCoors, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch 
Cos., LLC, No. 19-cv-218 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 21, 2019). 
13. Id. at 36. 
14. Myths, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, https://www.alz.org/alzheimers-dementia/what-is-alzheimers/ 
myths [https://perma.cc/7VDA-PD9B].  
15. Id. 
16. Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 
294, 295–96 (2d Cir. 1992). 
17. Id. at 296. 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., Telebrands Corp., TV Savings, LLC, & Ajit Khubani—Commission Opinion and 













advertising or labeling that highlights a product characteristic that some 
people erroneously believe makes a consumer or investment product 
superior to its competitors for a particular reason. Such advertising need not 
create or explicitly refer to the false belief. For example, the Bud Light 
advertisement did not state that corn syrup is healthier, and the Tums 
advertisements did not mention Alzheimer’s disease or any other reason 
why aluminum in antacids is undesirable. Nevertheless, these 
advertisements were designed to take advantage of many consumers’ 
erroneous pre-existing beliefs about corn syrup and aluminum.  
Advertisements and labels that exploit pre-existing beliefs are not 
uncommon. For example, mutual fund companies routinely advertise the 
past returns of their highest-performing equity mutual funds because many 
investors falsely believe that strong past performance is a good predictor of 
strong future performance. The advertisements do not explicitly claim that 
this belief is true. In fact, the advertisements are required by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission to include disclaimers explicitly warning that 
past results do not guarantee future results and discouraging investors from 
focusing very heavily on past returns. And yet, these advertisements are 
effective because many investors still have this false belief.20 
Similarly, until very recently, certain cigarette brands were promoted via 
labels and advertisements that exploited pre-existing beliefs by highlighting 
the fact that the cigarettes used tobacco that contained no chemical 
additives. These labels and advertisements did not explicitly claim that the 
lack of additives made the cigarettes safer than other cigarettes. In fact, they 
included a disclaimer mandated by the Federal Trade Commission stating 
that additive-free cigarettes are no safer than other cigarettes. Nevertheless, 
many smokers still erroneously believe that additive-free cigarettes are 
safer.21  
This article argues that advertisements and labels that exploit pre-
existing false beliefs are deceptive. The article uses insights from 
pragmatics, a branch of the field of linguistics, to explain why 
advertisements and labels that highlight a product characteristic—such as 
an antacid being aluminum-free or a mutual fund having high past returns 
—inherently imply that the product is superior to competitor products that 
don’t have the highlighted characteristic. 
Importantly, even to people who lack a pre-existing belief, these 
advertisements and labels falsely imply that the highlighted characteristic 
makes the product superior. Thus, although these advertisements and labels 
 
20. See infra Section III.A. 
21. See infra Section III.B. 











are referred to as exploiting pre-existing beliefs, they are deceptive even to 
people who lack pre-existing beliefs.  
These advertisements and labels harm consumers, investors, and 
companies. They cause people to falsely believe the product or investment 
is superior to that offered by competitors and distort people’s purchasing 
and investing decisions. This causes financial loss, reduced satisfaction, 
and, in some cases, even physical harm. Moreover, the exploitation of pre-
existing beliefs causes companies to waste valuable marketing resources 
developing or combatting deceptive advertisements and labels. 
Because this practice has been employed in advertisements and labels for 
many types of products, a number of federal agencies are involved in its 
regulation. The regulatory approach has often been to require the 
advertisement or label to include a disclaimer of the erroneous belief. This 
article examines the effectiveness of this approach and other possible 
regulatory approaches, ultimately arguing that often a stronger approach is 
justified: a prohibition against highlighting a product characteristic about 
which consumers’ have an erroneous belief. 
Section I of this article uses insights from pragmatics to explain why 
advertisements and labels that exploit erroneous pre-existing beliefs are 
deceptive. Section II describes how consumers, investors, and companies 
are harmed by this practice. Section III presents two case studies examining 
how regulatory agencies have regulated these advertisements and labels. In 
particular, it examines the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
regulation of equity mutual fund advertisements that present funds’ past 
returns, and the Federal Trade Commission’s and Food and Drug 
Administration’s actions regarding advertisements and labels for cigarettes 
made from tobacco lacking chemical additives. Section IV discusses 
possible regulatory approaches to advertisements and labels that exploit 
erroneous pre-existing beliefs and explores when each approach is best.  
I. ADVERTISEMENTS AND LABELS THAT EXPLOIT PRE-EXISTING BELIEFS 
ARE DECEPTIVE 
Pragmatics, a branch of the field of linguistics that studies “how language 
users actually use and interpret words and other signs in communication,”22 
explains why advertisements and labels that exploit erroneous pre-existing 
beliefs are misleading. Scholars in the field recognize that the meaning 
 
22. Harold Anthony Lloyd, Law’s “Way of Words”: Pragmatics and Textualist Error, 49 












communicated by words can depend on the context in which the words are 
communicated.23  
One of the most influential theories in pragmatics is Paul Grice’s so-
called theory of conversation.24 This theory describes how effective 
communication is achieved in common social situations. The theory posits 
that, when engaged in conversation, people act cooperatively and accept that 
statements made in the conversation will be understood in a particular 
way.25 Specifically, it posits that listeners and speakers will ordinarily 
understand what is implied by a statement by assuming that the speaker is 
following what Grice calls the “Cooperative Principle”: “Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which 
you are engaged.”26 
Grice proposed that the Cooperative Principle is manifested in certain 
maxims that people assume that speakers abide by.27 These maxims fall 
under one of four categories: Quality, Quantity, Manner, and Relation.28 
Among the maxims in each of the categories are: 
• Quality: “Try to make your contribution [to the conversation] 
one that is true.” 
• Quantity: “Make your contribution as informative as is required 
(for the current purposes of the exchange).” However, “Do not 
make your contribution more informative than is required.” 
• Manner: “Be perspicuous.” 
• Relation (or Relevance): “Be relevant.”29 
An example illustrates the importance of the maxim of Relevance in 
conversation. Imagine that a man leaving a store says to the shopkeeper, 
“I’m hungry, are there any good restaurants nearby?” and the shopkeeper 
replies, “There’s a good restaurant that’s a ten-minute walk from here.” 
Although she did not explicitly say so, the shopkeeper’s reply clearly 
implies that the shopkeeper believes that the restaurant is open now, because 
 
23. John David Ohlendorf, Against Coherence in Statutory Interpretation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
735, 752–53 (2014); see also LED ZEPPELIN, Stairway to Heaven, on LED ZEPPELIN IV (Atlantic 
Records 1971) (“There’s a sign on the wall, but she wants to be sure, ‘cause you know sometimes words 
have two meanings.”). 
24. Lloyd, supra note 22, at 227 (“[M]uch of modern pragmatics began with the discourse 
analyses of Paul Grice.”). 
25. PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 22, 26 (1989). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id.  
29. Id. at 26–27. 











if she knew that the restaurant were closed, then her reply would not be 
relevant to the conversation. A closed restaurant is useless to a hungry 
person. In other words, because the man believes that the shopkeeper is 
abiding by the maxim “Be relevant,” he interprets the shopkeeper’s reply in 
a way that makes it relevant to the conversation that he initiated. 30  
Since Grice, scholarship in conversational implicature31 generally has 
taken one of two approaches: “Relevance Theorists, who have attempted to 
build a theory of pragmatics and implicature on Grice’s maxim of 
Relevance alone . . . and the work of the Neo-Griceans, who have worked 
to salvage as much of Grice’s framework as possible.” 32 Under both of these 
approaches, people in conversations are still generally assumed to believe 
that statements made in a conversation are relevant to that conversation.33 
Thus, it is widely accepted that listeners ordinarily will interpret statements 
in such a way as to make them relevant to the conversation. 
This behavior of listeners also helps explain how people interpret 
statements made in advertising. Companies design product advertisements 
and labels to sell the products,34 so consumers likely assume that statements 
companies choose to make in advertisements and on labels are relevant to 
that purpose (i.e., to convince consumers to buy the products). Consumers 
should understand advertising and labels that highlight a particular product 
characteristic as implying that that product characteristic should make 
consumers more likely to buy the product. Therefore, if a particular 
characteristic is highlighted in an advertisement or label, consumers likely 
 
30. This example is similar to one put forward by Grice in which a person tells someone seeking 
gas that a particular gas station is nearby. Id. at 32. 
31. “Conversational implicature” is a term introduced by Grice. He used it to refer to what must 
be assumed that a speaker in conversation sought to convey, if a speaker were to be abiding by the 
Cooperative Principle. Id. at 26. 
32. Ohlendorf, supra note 23, at 752 n.92.  
33. Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber, Relevance Theory, in THE HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 607, 
607 (Laurence R. Horn & Gregory Ward eds., 2006) (noting that Relevance Theory “share[s] Grice’s 
intuition that utterances raise expectations of relevance”); Laurence R. Horn, Implicature, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 3, 13 (Laurence R. Horn & Gregory Ward eds., 2006) (a prominent Neo-
Gricean proposing replacing Grice’s Quantity, Relevance, and Manner conversational principles with 
two interrelated principles: the Q Principle (“Say as much as you can, modulo Quality and R”) and the 
R principle (“Say no more than you must, modulo Q”), and stating that the R principle “collects the 
Relation maxim” and some of Grice’s other maxims). 
34. Ana Gotter, Product Advertisement vs. Institutional Advertisement: What You Need to Know, 
DISRUPTIVE ADVERT. (June 20, 2018), https://www.disruptiveadvertising.com/ppc/ecommerce/pro 
duct-advertisement-vs-institutional-advertisement/ [https://perma.cc/LX9D-C3B9] (“Product 
advertisements are trying to sell specific products immediately.”); Importance of Labelling in Marketing, 
PACKAGING - LABELLING, https://www.packaging-labelling.com/articles/importance-of-labelling-in-m 
arketing [https://perma.cc/2YB8-XSZ8] (“[Product labeling] plays a key role as a point of sale display 












believe that it is implying that the characteristic makes the product superior 
to competitors’ products.35  
There is also reason to believe that consumers assume relevance more in 
advertising and labels than in other contexts. Routine conversations between 
people—such as that between the patron and the shopkeeper in the earlier 
example—are essentially costless for the parties to engage in. Someone 
making an irrelevant statement in a routine conversation wastes time, but 
little else. In contrast, advertising is expensive,36 and label design, as well 
as the information provided on a label, is important to consumers.37 Thus, 
consumers might believe it less plausible that an advertiser would waste 
funds or valuable label space highlighting a product characteristic that is 
irrelevant to consumers.  
In summary, advertising and labels that highlight a product characteristic 
imply that the characteristic makes the product superior. If the characteristic 
does not actually make the product superior, the advertisement is deceptive. 
Importantly, such advertisements and labels are deceptive even to people 
who lack a pre-existing belief regarding the characteristic. Pragmatics 
theory explains why people assume that a highlighted characteristic makes 
a product superior.38 This explanation does not depend on people having 
pre-existing beliefs regarding the characteristic’s relevance. 
For example, consider again a label or advertisement touting that an 
antacid is “aluminum-free.” The lack of aluminum would only be relevant 
to a consumer’s purchase decision if aluminum is undesirable for some 
reason. Thus, advertising that an antacid is aluminum-free implies that 
aluminum in antacid is undesirable. This implication does not depend on the 
person viewing the advertisement having a pre-existing belief that 
aluminum is undesirable. Even a consumer who has no pre-existing belief 
regarding aluminum’s desirability—or who even for some reason believes 
 
35. See Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False 
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1325–27 (2011) (discussing research that “has confirmed the 
effectiveness of [advertising] exploiting the expectation of relevance” and discussing cases where 
courts’ reasoning in finding advertisements made false claims have “accord[ed] with the rules of 
implicature; the ad[s] exploited reasonable consumers’ beliefs that information is only provided when 
relevant”). 
36. For example, the cost of running an advertisement in a national magazine is approximately 
$250,000, and the cost of running a thirty-second national television advertisement is approximately 
$342,000, plus the cost of designing and producing the advertisement. The Cost of Advertising 
Nationally Broken Down by Medium, WEBFX, https://www.webfx.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2 
016/01/cost-of-advertising-nationally-broken-down-by-medium-02.png [https://perma.cc/KM24-SSA 
3]. 
37. Shoppers Reveal the Packaging & Labeling Techniques that Grab Their Attention, LUMINER 
CONVERTING GROUP, INC., https://www.luminer.com/articles/survey-packaging-labeling-grab-shopper 
s-attention/ [https://perma.cc/2N6N-KX8J] (reporting results of an August 2017 consumer survey 
showing importance of label design and information included on labels). 
38. See supra text accompanying notes 22–34. 











that aluminum in antacid is desirable—should understand the advertisement 
as implying that aluminum is undesirable. After all, why else would an 
advertiser tout that its antacid is “aluminum-free?” 
Although the advertisement is misleading to all consumers, it might have 
a stronger effect on consumers who have a pre-existing belief regarding the 
highlighted characteristic. Compared to other people, those who have a pre-
existing belief might be more likely to understand the advertisement as 
referring to that specific belief. For example, consider again an 
advertisement highlighting that a particular antacid is “aluminum-free.” 
Because the advertisement provides no other reason why aluminum is 
undesirable, consumers who believe there is a link between aluminum and 
Alzheimer’s disease will likely assume that the advertisement is referring to 
that link, as people tend to interpret information in a way that will confirm 
their pre-existing notions.39 Thus, to those consumers, the advertisement is 
likely to falsely imply that aluminum can cause Alzheimer’s. A consumer 
who whole-heartedly held the pre-existing belief will likely feel validated 
by the advertisement.40 A consumer who heard a rumor that aluminum 
causes Alzheimer’s, yet is not sure that the rumor is true, will likely now 
feel more confident in that belief.41 
In contrast, consumers who are unaware of the myth that aluminum can 
cause Alzheimer’s disease would be very unlikely to assume that an 
advertisement for an aluminum-free antacid was referring to Alzheimer’s. 
Such consumers might instead simply speculate that the advertisement is 
implying that the lack of aluminum makes the antacid more effective or 
have fewer minor side effects. Nevertheless, this might make them more 
likely to buy the antacid than are consumers who are unaware that it does 
not contain aluminum.42 
 
39. Stephanie M. Stern, Outpsyched: The Battle of Expertise in Psychology-Informed Law, 57 
JURIMETRICS 45, 53 (2016) (“An extensive body of research in motivated reasoning shows that we 
process information in ways that support our goals, including the goal of maintaining preexisting 
beliefs . . . .”). 
40. See Kirsten Weir, Why We Believe Alternative Facts, 48 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 24 (2017), 
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2017/05/alternative-facts [https://perma.cc/6E9Y-6QHJ] (quoting Peter 
Ditto as saying, “Motivated reasoning is a pervasive tendency of human cognition . . . . People are 
capable of being thoughtful and rational, but our wishes, hopes, fears and motivations often tip the scales 
to make us more likely to accept something as true if it supports what we want to believe.”).  
41. See Linda A. Henkel & Mark E. Mattson, Reading is Believing: The Truth Effect and Source 
Credibility, 20 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 1705, 1705 (2011) (finding that repeated exposure to a 
statement increases people’s belief in the validity of the statement). 
42. Legally, an advertisement can be deceptive regardless of whether consumers are actually 
deceived by the advertisement or change their purchase behavior in response to it. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. 
LoanPointe, LLC, 525 F. App’x 696, 701 (10th Cir. 2013) (Under § 5 of the FTC Act, “[t]he FTC does 
not need to prove actual deception, only the likelihood that a consumer . . . acting reasonably under the 












For some product characteristics, individuals might be able to infer why 
the highlighted characteristic is allegedly relevant even if they were 
previously unaware of that reason. For example, even a person who is 
unaware that others believe an equity mutual fund’s high past returns are a 
good predictor of high future returns would likely understand a mutual fund 
advertisement touting a fund’s high past returns as implying that the fund is 
likely to earn high future returns. It is difficult to imagine why else a fund’s 
past returns would be relevant to an investor’s decision of whether to invest 
in a particular mutual fund.  
II. EXPLOITING PRE-EXISTING BELIEFS HARMS CONSUMERS, INVESTORS, 
AND COMPANIES 
Advertising and labels play an important role in market economies by 
providing information about characteristics of available products and 
investments. This information helps consumers and investors make 
purchase and investment decisions that maximize their welfare.43 
Furthermore, better-informed consumers and investors incentivize firms to 
compete with each other to provide superior or lower-priced consumer and 
investment products.44 
In contrast, deceptive advertising and labels harm the marketplace, 
consumers, and investors.45 Consumers’ purchase decisions can be distorted 
by an advertisement or label that misleads consumers into believing that a 
particular product characteristic makes a product superior; consumers who 
are deceived into believing that a more expensive product is more effective 
or safer might buy that product rather than a cheaper, equally effective and 
safe alternative. For example, an advertisement that leads consumers to 
believe that additive-free cigarettes are safer can cause consumers to 
purchase those cigarettes rather than less expensive ones. For instance, 
consumers erroneously believe that the relatively expensive American Spirit 
cigarettes, which use organic and additive-free tobacco, are less harmful 
than other cigarettes.46  
More importantly, this erroneous belief might cause people who smoke 
additive-free cigarettes to reduce their efforts to stop smoking. If people 
 
43. Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. & ECON. 
491, 492 (1981). 
44. Id. 
45. See F.T.C. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(“‘[M]isleading advertising’ does not serve, and, in fact, disserves, th[e] interest” of “consumers and 
society . . . ‘in the free flow of commercial information.’” (first quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 
(1982); then quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
763 (1976))). 
46. Anna E. Epperson, Trent O. Johnson, Nina C. Schleicher & Lisa Henriksen, The Price of 
Natural American Spirit Relative to Other Cigarette Brands, NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 1, 4 (2019). 











think they are smoking cigarettes that are less harmful than regular 
cigarettes, they have less incentive to quit smoking for health reasons. 
Indeed, until fairly recently, low-nicotine and low-tar cigarette brands were 
marketed as being “light,”47 and consumers erroneously believed that those 
brands were safer than other cigarettes,48 making people who smoked those 
brands less likely to quit smoking.49  
Deceptive advertisements and labels might also cause consumers to buy 
less effective products.50 For example, a label that implies that a particular 
aluminum-free antacid is safer can cause consumers to buy it rather than a 
brand that is more effective.  
Along the same vein, investors can be harmed by mutual fund 
advertisements that highlight an equity mutual fund’s high past returns. 
These advertisements imply that the strong returns are likely to continue.51 
Consequently, these advertisements encourage investors to invest in the 
advertised funds rather than funds that might be better matched to the 
investors’ investment objectives and risk tolerances. There is evidence that 
these advertisements are effective, causing investors to invest in the 
advertised funds.52  
Furthermore, these advertisements can cause investors to invest in funds 
with higher costs. For example, imagine an advertisement touting that a 
particular mutual fund has earned 3 percent higher annual returns than its 
peers. Investors who believe this outperformance is likely to continue will 
 
47. Hilary A. Tindle et al., Cessation Among Smokers of “Light” Cigarettes: Results from the 
2000 National Health Interview Survey, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1498, 1498 (2006). The Tobacco 
Control Act of 2009 prohibited the use of the terms “light,” “low,” “mild,” and similar descriptors in 
tobacco product advertising, labels, or labeling without an FDA order allowing the use of such terms. 
21 U.S.C. § 387k (2012). I could find no case in which the FDA has granted such an order. 
48. C. Keith Haddock et al., Modified Tobacco Use and Lifestyle Change in Risk-Reducing 
Beliefs About Smoking, 27 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 35, 38–39 tbls. 2–3 (2004) (finding over 70% of 
smokers surveyed believe that low tar/nicotine cigarettes reduce health risks from smoking); Tindle et 
al., supra note 47, at 1498 (discussing research finding that light cigarettes do not reduce risk of tobacco-
related disease); id. at 1502 (finding that “adoption of light cigarettes to reduce health risks was common, 
being reported by more than one third of US adults who had ever smoked”). 
49. Tindle et al., supra note 47, at 1500-02 (finding that “smokers who adopted light cigarettes 
with the intention of reducing health risks were markedly less likely to subsequently quit smoking” than 
were other smokers); Haddock et al., supra note 48, at 38–40 tbls. 2–3 (noting survey results suggest 
that “the belief that low[ tar/nicotine] cigarettes may substantially lower the risks of tobacco use remains 
ubiquitous across smoking status and gender and significantly lowers the likelihood of quitting” 
smoking). 
50. See Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 671 (1977). 
51. See infra Section III.A. 
52. Prem C. Jain & Joanna Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising: Evidence on Future 
Performance and Fund Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937, 956–57 (2000) (finding that equity mutual funds featured 
in performance advertisements in Barron’s and Money magazine garnered 20 percent more flow—the 
net amount invested in a fund during a particular period—than did similar nonadvertised funds, and that 












prefer that fund even if it has a 1 percent higher annual expense ratio than 
do competitor funds. Indeed, evidence exists that investors choosing among 
mutual funds give much more weight to the funds’ advertised past returns 
than to the funds’ expense ratios, even when those expense ratios are highly 
salient in the advertisements.53  
Unfortunately for these investors, high returns generally do not persist in 
the long run at least in part because high returns very often are due to luck 
rather than the fund managers’ investing skill.54 Low-cost funds (such as 
index funds), on the other hand, generally continue to have low costs, and 
thus higher returns in the long run.55 Hence, ironically, by encouraging 
investors to invest in funds with high past returns, these advertisements 
cause investors to pay less attention to low-cost funds, which are more likely 
to give them higher future returns. 
As previously mentioned, highlighting a characteristic can increase an 
individual’s confidence in a pre-existing belief. However, even if an 
advertisement or label doesn’t increase the strength of a person’s belief 
regarding the characteristic, it might increase the weight that person puts on 
the characteristic in his or her purchase or investment decisions. For 
example, investors choosing among mutual funds might weigh several 
factors, including the funds’ risks, investment objectives, costs, and 
expected returns. An advertisement that highlights a fund’s past returns 
might make the returns more salient, causing investors to put more weight 
on that factor.56 Similarly, consumers choosing among antacids might weigh 
several factors, such as the antacids’ effectiveness, costs, and safety. An 
“aluminum-free” label might make safety considerations more salient, 
causing consumers to put more weight on the false, perceived safety 
considerations.  
 
53. Beth A. Pontari et al., Regulating Information Disclosure in Mutual Fund Advertising in the 
United States: Will Consumers Utilize Cost Information?, 32 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 333, 346, 348 (2009). 
54. Laurent Barras et al., False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in 
Estimated Alphas, 65 J. FIN. 179, 196–200 (2010); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Luck Versus 
Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund Returns, 65 J. FIN. 1915, 1916 (2010). Another reason why 
high returns generally don’t persist in the long run might be the tendency of investors to flock to mutual 
funds that have had high returns. This behavior causes successful mutual fund managers to have to invest 
a greater amount of money, making it more difficult to continue to produce higher returns, as larger 
funds have fewer investment options than smaller funds. See Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual 
Fund Performance Advertising: Inherently and Materially Misleading?, 46 GA. L. REV. 289, 302–03 
(2012) and references cited therein. 
55. Mark M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 80 (1997) 
(finding that expense ratios and portfolio turnover are “siginificantly and negatively related to 
performance”). 
56. People exhibit a salience bias in that they “are likely to focus on information or items that 
are prominent or salient and ignore those that are less visible.” Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the 
Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 253 (2011). 











In addition, the highlighting of the product characteristic might make 
consumers more likely to find products with that characteristic, increasing 
the likelihood that they purchase the product because of their erroneous 
belief. For example, even consumers who erroneously believe that 
aluminum can cause Alzheimer’s disease might buy antacids that they are 
unaware contain aluminum. Although they could check for aluminum in the 
Drug Facts—which includes the product ingredients—on the antacid’s label 
before buying the product, many people are unlikely to do so, especially if 
they are unaware that some antacids contain aluminum.57 However, an 
antacid advertisement or label that highlights the lack of aluminum directs 
them to a particular brand that is aluminum-free and alerts them to the fact 
that some antacids contain aluminum, perhaps causing them to start 
checking for aluminum when choosing an antacid.  
A final harm caused by advertisements and labels that falsely imply that 
a particular characteristic makes a product superior is that they waste 
companies’ resources. Makers of these products spend resources on 
producing these deceptive advertisements and labels, rather than on 
improving the quality—or reducing the prices—of their products to 
compete more effectively. Furthermore, if people are deceived into 
believing that the products are better than they actually are, these 
advertisements and labels make it harder for truly better products to 
distinguish themselves in people’s minds. This can force producers of 
superior products to spend more resources on advertising to convince 
consumers and investors that their products are better than competitors’ 
products.  
III. HOW REGULATORY AGENCIES TREAT EXPLOITATION OF PRE-
EXISTING BELIEFS 
Part of the mandate of federal agencies tasked with regulating advertising 
and labeling is to prevent advertisements and labels from being deceptive. 
For example, Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits 
“deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” and authorizes the 
 
57. In a poll, 75 percent of consumers stated they “review the ingredients on the labels of [over-
the-counter] medicines before using to see if any other medications they may be taking also have those 
ingredients.” New US Survey Confirms that US Consumers Correctly Read the Label Before Using an 
OTC Medicine, WORLD SELF-MEDICATION INDUSTRY (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.wsmi.org/new-us-
survey-confirms-that-us-consumers-correctly-read-the-label-before-using-an-otc-medicine/ [https://per 
ma.cc/79LN-JS5P]. However, it is unclear whether as high a proportion would read an antacid label. See 
Warning: Aspirin-Containing Antacid Medicines Can Cause Bleeding, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm505110.htm [https://perma.cc/AP2M-MU 
B8] (quoting Karen Murry Mahoney, Deputy Director of the Division of Nonprescription Drug Products 
at FDA, as saying, “Unless people read the Drug Facts label when they’re looking for stomach symptom 












Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to prevent them.58 In enforcing this 
statute, the FTC and courts have defined deception as a material 
representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead a significant 
minority of consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.59 A 
representation can be deceptive even if it is only implied rather than 
explicit.60 
Similarly, the general antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, 
which the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is tasked with 
enforcing, prohibit the use of materially false or misleading information in 
selling securities, including mutual funds. Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities 
Act of 1933 prohibits, in the offer or sale of any security by communication 
in interstate commerce, “obtain[ing] money or property by means of any 
untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”61 Rule 10b-5, 
promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
forbids, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security by any 
means or instrument of interstate commerce or by mail, “mak[ing] any 
untrue statement of a material fact or . . . omit[ting] to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”62 
Furthermore, Section 33(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
prohibits in any registration statement or other document transmitted 
pursuant to the Act “any untrue statement of a material fact” or the omission 
of “any fact necessary in order to prevent the statements made therein, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, from being 
materially misleading.”63  
Relatedly, the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act gives the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) the authority to monitor and regulate the 
safety of food, drugs, devices, tobacco products, and cosmetics.64 The Act 
forbids misbranding of these products or the sale of such misbranded 
 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). 
59. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Tashman, 318 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003); POM Wonderful, LLC 
v. F.T.C., 777 F.3d 478, 490 (D.C. Cir. 2015); In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164–65 
(1984) (discussing the FTC’s Policy Statement on Deception).  
60. Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311, 318–19 (7th Cir. 1992). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012). 
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018). 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2012). 
64. 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 387a (2012). The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act delegates authority to 
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services through which it is ultimately delegated 
to the FDA. James T. O’Reilly, 1 Food & Drug Admin. § 2.1 (2019). 











products.65 Included in the definition of misbranding is product labeling that 
is “false or misleading.”66  
Thus, federal regulatory agencies have broad authority to prevent 
deceptive advertisements and labels. The deception can take the form not 
only of explicitly false statements but also statements that are misleading. 
Advertisements and labels that exploit erroneous pre-existing beliefs 
generally take the second form—they include a statement about a product 
that is true yet misleading because it implies a falsehood.  
As will be discussed in Section IV of this article, several possible 
approaches exist to regulating advertisements and labels that exploit 
people’s erroneous pre-existing beliefs. The current section, however, first 
examines the approach taken by the SEC in its regulation of mutual fund 
performance advertisements and the differing approaches taken by the FTC 
and FDA regarding the advertisements and labels of cigarettes made from 
tobacco with no chemical additives.  
A. SEC Regulation of Mutual Fund Performance Advertisements 
Mutual fund companies regularly use performance advertisements, 
which present the past returns earned by the advertised funds. For example, 
almost 42 percent of mutual fund advertisements in Barron’s and Money 
magazines over a two-year period mentioned a fund’s high or increasing 
returns.67 An additional 26 percent of the advertisements explicitly 
discussed a fund’s risk-adjusted returns.68 Similarly, past returns were 
mentioned, on average, in 62 percent of fund advertisements appearing in 
Money magazine over a nine-year period and in 59 percent of fund 
advertisements appearing in BusinessWeek magazine over a ten-year 
period.69  
Performance advertisements are especially prevalent when stock market 
returns in general have been high. For example, there is a very high 
correlation (greater than 0.7) between the recent performance of the stock 
market in general and the percentage of equity fund advertisements in 
Money and BusinessWeek magazines that present past returns.70 This 
 
65. 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2012). 
66. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)(1) (Supp. V Vol. II 2013–2018) (defining misbranded drugs and devices); 
21 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2012) (defining misbranded food); 21 U.S.C. § 387c (2012) (defining misbranded 
tobacco products); 21 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (defining misbranded cosmetics). 
67. Bruce A. Huhmann & Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya, Does Mutual Fund Advertising Provide 
Necessary Investment Information?, 23 INT’L J. BANK MARKETING 296, 300, 303 (2005).  
68. Id.  
69. Sendhil Mullainathan, Joshua Schwartzstein & Andrei Shleifer, Coarse Thinking and 
Persuasion, 123 Q. J. ECON. 577, 609 (2008).  
70. Id. In particular, the correlation of one-quarter-lagged S&P 500 returns with the percentage 












indicates that fund companies use performance advertisements to highlight 
funds’ past returns when those returns have been high. 
In addition, fund companies are especially likely to advertise those funds 
that have outperformed other funds. For example, a study of equity fund 
performance advertisements in Barron’s and Money magazines found that 
the advertised funds outperformed funds with the same investment objective 
by an average of almost 6 percent over the twelve months prior to the 
advertisements.71 Similarly, a study of equity fund performance 
advertisements in BusinessWeek and Fortune magazines found that fund 
companies tend to advertise their best-performing funds.72 
Thus, mutual fund companies engage in selective advertising by using 
performance advertisements primarily for their equity funds with the 
highest past returns. Fund companies do this to exploit investors’ pre-
existing belief that strong past returns are a good predictor of strong future 
returns. Indeed, research has found that investors who have a stronger belief 
that a fund’s high past returns predict high future returns are more likely 
than other investors to invest in mutual funds with advertised high past 
returns.73 However, that belief is erroneous; equity funds that have 
outperformed their peers generally do not continue to do so in the long run.74  
The SEC closely regulates performance advertisements. Some of this 
regulation is intended to prevent fund companies from selectively choosing 
which periods’ returns to advertise. For example, a mutual fund company 
that runs a fund that performed well in 2017—but poorly before and after 
that—might wish to advertise only the fund’s 2017 return. But investors 
who viewed such an advertisement would be misled if they inferred from 
 
BusinessWeek. Id. See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-697, MUTUAL FUND 
ADVERTISING: IMPROVING HOW REGULATORS COMMUNICATE NEW RULE INTERPRETATIONS TO 
INDUSTRY WOULD FURTHER PROTECT INVESTORS 15 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11697.p 
df [https://perma.cc/9PVF-C3SF] (“[A]gency officials and representatives of mutual fund companies 
with whom we spoke, as well as some researchers, said that more advertisements showing superior past 
returns for mutual funds appear after the market has performed well.”). 
71. Prem C. Jain & Joanna Shuang Wu, Truth in Mutual Fund Advertising: Evidence on Future 
Performance and Fund Flows, 55 J. FIN. 937, 943–44 (2000). The advertised funds also outperformed 
other benchmarks, although by less. In particular, they outperformed the S&P 500 by almost 2 percent 
and had a four-factor alpha of over 1 percent. Id. at 943–45. The four-factor alpha is a risk-adjusted 
measure of a fund’s excess return compared to a benchmark index. Id. at 944. 
72. Jonathan J. Koehler & Molly Mercer, Selection Neglect in Mutual Fund Advertisements, 55 
MGMT. SCI. 1107, 1109–10 (2009). 
73. See Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Worthless Warnings? Testing the 
Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Advertisements, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 453–55 
(2010) (finding that people were less willing to invest in an advertised mutual fund when the 
advertisement contained a disclaimer that reduced their belief that high past returns are good predictors 
of high future returns). 
74. Fama & French, supra note 54, at 1916; Barras et al., supra note 54, at 181; ALEX BRYAN & 
JAMES LI, MORNINGSTAR MANAGER RESEARCH, PERFORMANCE PERSISTENCE AMONG U.S. MUTUAL 
FUNDS 14 (2016), http://www.fwp.partners/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Performance-Persistence-Mor 
ningstar-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SM3-R858]. 











the 2017 return that the fund usually performs well. Thus, Rule 482, 
promulgated by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933, standardizes how 
past returns in mutual fund performance advertisements may be calculated 
and presented.75 For example, performance advertisements for an equity 
fund must report the fund’s average annual total returns for the last one, 
five, and ten years.76  
Ultimately, the SEC’s rules restrict fund companies’ ability to select 
which periods’ returns to advertise, but do not eliminate it. For example, 
while Rule 482 requires performance advertisements to present the funds’ 
average annual total returns over the last one, five, and ten years, the 
advertisements may also include—for any time periods—any other 
performance measure that “[r]eflects all elements of return,” such as 
aggregate, average, year-by-year, or other types of total return 
calculations.77 Nevertheless, those returns must supplement, not replace, the 
required returns, and they may not be presented more prominently than the 
required returns.78  
But even performance advertisements that do not selectively choose 
which years’ returns to advertise imply a falsehood that many investors 
already believe: strong past returns are a good predictor of strong future 
returns. In some of these advertisements, this implication is not subtle. For 
example, advertisements that tout funds’ “proven” performance can only be 
understood as implying that they are likely to continue to have strong returns 
in the future because the funds had high returns in the past.79 Moreover, 
even performance advertisements without such language still inherently 
imply that the funds’ strong performance should continue. 
The SEC is aware that investors put great weight on funds’ past returns, 
so the Commission’s regulation of performance advertisements attempts to 
dissuade investors from relying too heavily on those returns. All Rule 482 
advertisements, regardless of whether they contain past returns, must 
include a statement that “advises an investor to consider the investment 
objectives, risks, and charges and expenses of the investment company 
carefully before investing” and that directs readers to the fund’s prospectus 
 
75. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482 (2018). When adopting this rule, the SEC indicated that this requirement 
was partly intended to limit fund companies’ ability to mislead investors by selectively choosing which 
periods’ returns to advertise. Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 
57,760, 57,765 (Oct. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, and 274).  
76. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(d)(3). If the fund’s registration statement has been in effect for less than 
one, five, or ten years, then the company must instead report the average annual total return since the 
registration statement has been in effect. Id. 
77. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(d)(5). 
78. Id.  
79. See, e.g., Fidelity, Advertisement, Knowledge is Power, FORBES, Jan. 28, 2008, at 2–3 













to obtain this and other information about the fund.80 In addition, Rule 482 
requires performance advertisements to contain a warning that  
past performance does not guarantee future results; that the 
investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate 
so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or 
less than their original cost; and that current performance may be 
lower or higher than the performance data quoted.81 
Unfortunately, this warning is too weak. It merely warns that the 
advertised high past returns do not guarantee high future returns, that a 
fund’s returns vary over time, and that an investor can even lose money in 
a fund. The warning does not inform investors that high past returns are not 
good predictors of high future returns. In fact, warning that past 
performance does not “guarantee” future results arguably implies that high 
past returns are a good predictor of high future returns, just not a guarantee 
of them. 
To test the effectiveness of this SEC-mandated warning, Molly Mercer, 
Alan Palmiter, and I conducted an experiment.82 Participants in the 
experiment were each shown one version of a fictional equity mutual fund’s 
performance advertisement that was based on an advertisement that had 
recently appeared in Money magazine.83 The versions of the advertisement 
differed in the strength and prominence of the warning against relying on 
past returns to predict future returns.84 
The experiment found that the SEC-mandated warning is completely 
ineffective. In particular, participants who saw the advertisement with that 
warning did not have lower expectations regarding the fund’s future returns 
and were not less likely to invest in the fund than were investors who saw a 
version of the advertisement that lacked any warning at all.85 
B. FTC and FDA Standards for Advertisements and Labels of Additive-
Free Cigarettes 
Many smokers erroneously believe that additive-free cigarettes are 
healthier than other cigarettes.86 As a result, some tobacco companies have 
 
80. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(b)(1). 
81. Id. § 230.482(b)(3)(i). This exact wording is not required; any warning that “clearly 
communicates” this information is sufficient. Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, 
68 Fed. Reg. 57,760, 57,765 (Oct. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, and 274).  
82. That experiment is presented in Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 73. 
83. Id. at 445. 
84. Id. at 445–46. 
85. Id. at 449, 453. 
86. Sabeeh A. Baig et al., “Organic,” “Natural,” and “Additive-Free” Cigarettes: Comparing 
the Effects of Advertising Claims and Disclaimers on Perceptions of Harm, 21 NICOTINE & TOBACCO 











marketed cigarettes made from tobacco that lacks chemical additives.87 
Their advertisements and cigarette package labels deceive consumers into 
believing that those brands are safer than other cigarette brands.88 Indeed, 
in 1999 and 2000, the FTC filed suit against three companies—Alternative 
Cigarettes, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, and Santa Fe Natural 
Tobacco Company—claiming that their advertisements for their additive-
free cigarettes “represented, expressly or by implication, that smoking [the] 
cigarettes, because they contain no additives, is less hazardous to a smoker’s 
health than smoking otherwise comparable cigarettes that contain 
additives.”89  
Importantly, only one of the advertisements cited in the FTC’s 
complaints explicitly claimed that additive-free cigarettes might be 
healthier; one of the Alternative Cigarettes advertisements stated that 
“Native Americans smoked all natural tobacco without the ills that are 
associated with smoking today. Could it be that the chemicals and additives 
cause more health problems than the natural tobacco itself? Much research 
needs to be done on this subject.”90 In fact, the other advertisements 
 
RES. 933, 934 (2019) (“Current research indicates that no cigarettes are safer than any others. However, 
studies have consistently shown that cigarettes marketed as ‘organic,’ ‘natural,’ or ‘additive-free’ are 
perceived to be less harmful.” (citation omitted)). 
87. Patricia A. McDaniel & Ruth E. Malone, “I Always Thought They Were All Pure Tobacco”: 
American Smokers’ Perceptions of “Natural” Cigarettes and Tobacco Industry Advertising Strategies, 
16 TOBACCO CONTROL e7, 5–6 (2007). 
88. Jennifer L. Pearson et al., American Spirit Pack Descriptors and Perceptions of Harm: A 
Crowdsourced Comparison of Modified Packs, 18 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 1749, 1755 (2016) 
(finding that the phrase “100% Additive-Free” on the label of a pack of American Sprit cigarettes 
reduced consumers’ perception of the health risk from smoking the cigarettes); Baig et al., supra note 
86, at 936 (finding that consumers who viewed a cigarette advertisement believed the cigarettes were 
less harmful if the advertisement stated the cigarettes used “additive-free” tobacco rather than if it stated 
that they used “regular” tobacco). 
89. Complaint ¶ 5, In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 128 F.T.C. 262 (Aug. 16, 1999) (No. C-
3892), 1999 WL 33913037, at *1. Because Santa Fe’s advertisements referred to their products as 
“chemical-additive-free” rather than just additive-free, the FTC’s complaint against Santa Fe claimed 
that the company “represented, expressly or by implication, that smoking [the] cigarettes, because they 
contain no additives or chemicals, is less hazardous to a smoker’s health than smoking otherwise 
comparable cigarettes that contain additives or chemicals.” Complaint ¶ 5, In re Santa Fe Nat. Tobacco 
Co., No. 992-3026 (F.T.C. Apr. 27, 2000), 2000 WL 559854, at *1 (emphasis added). Similarly, the 
advertisements of Alternative Cigarettes specified that its cigarettes contained “no added chemicals, 
flavorings, [or] preservatives,” so the FTC’s complaint against Alternative Cigarettes claimed that the 
company “represented, expressly or by implication, that smoking [the] cigarettes, because they contain 
no additives, chemicals, flavorings or preservatives, is less hazardous to a smoker’s health than smoking 
otherwise comparable cigarettes that contain additives, chemicals, flavorings or preservatives.” 
Complaint ¶¶ 5–6, In re Alt. Cigarettes, Inc., No. 992-3022 (F.T.C. Apr. 27, 2000), 2000 WL 559811, 
at *2–4 (emphasis added). 












contained no health claims, and the advertisements displayed the Surgeon 
General’s standard required health warnings against smoking.91  
Instead of making health claims, most of the advertisements cited in the 
FTC’s complaints claimed that additive-free cigarettes taste better or last 
longer than other cigarettes. Six of the seven R.J. Reynolds advertisements 
stated, “No additives are in our tobacco, for true taste,” “No additives in our 
tobacco means true taste, straight up,” or had taglines stating: “100% 
Tobacco True taste” or “New Winston . . . No Additives . . . True Taste.”92 
Likewise, one of the three cited Santa Fe advertisements stated that the 
advertised cigarettes were “made from 100% chemical-additive-free natural 
tobacco . . . and nothing else,” which results in “great tobacco flavor, with 
no chemical after taste.”93 That advertisement also encouraged consumers 
to “[d]iscover the slower-burning, longer-lasting, all-natural smoking 
experience.”94 The remaining cited R.J. Reynolds and Sante Fe 
advertisements provided no reason why additive-free cigarettes are superior 
to other cigarettes.95 
Thus, the FTC cited the advertisements for additive-free cigarettes as 
implying that these cigarettes were healthier than other cigarettes not only 
when the advertisements did not explicitly make such a claim, but also even 
when the advertisements explicitly gave some other, non-health reason for 
why additive-free cigarettes were superior. The FTC apparently believed 
that these advertisements still implied that the cigarettes were healthier. 
To settle its claims that the advertisements were misleading, the FTC 
entered into consent decrees with the three companies that required 
advertisements for their additive-free cigarettes to include a disclaimer that 
“[n]o additives in our tobacco does NOT mean a safer cigarette.”96 
Nine years later, in 2009, Congress gave the FDA broad new authority 
over tobacco products by enacting the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act (“Tobacco Control Act”).97 Among its provisions 
 
91. Complaint at exs. A–C, Santa Fe Nat. Tobacco Co., No. 992-3026, 2000 WL 559854, at *2; 
Complaint at exs. A–F, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 128 F.T.C. 262 (No. C-3892), 1999 WL 33913037, 
at *2.  
92. Complaint at exs. A, C–F, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 128 F.T.C. 262 (No. C-3892), 1999 
WL 33913037, at *2. 
93. Complaint at ex. B, Santa Fe Nat. Tobacco Co., No. 992-3026, 2000 WL 559854, at *2. 
94. Id.  
95. Complaint at ex. B, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 128 F.T.C. 262 (No. C-3892), 1999 WL 
33913037, at *2; Complaint at exs. A, C, Santa Fe Nat. Tobacco Co., No. 992-3026, 2000 WL 559854, at 
*2. 
96. Consent Order, In re Alt. Cigarettes, Inc., No. 992-3022, 2000 WL 559811; Consent Order, 
Santa Fe Nat. Tobacco Co., No. 992-3026, 2000 WL 559854; Consent Order, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co., 128 F.T.C. 262 (No. C-3892). 
97. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 
1776 (2009) (codified as amended in sections of 5, 15, and 21 U.S.C.). 











were those giving the FDA the authority to regulate “modified risk tobacco 
products,” which were defined as including a tobacco product with a  
label, labeling, or advertising . . . which represents explicitly or 
implicitly that—(I) the tobacco product presents a lower risk of 
tobacco-related disease or is less harmful than one or more other 
commercially marketed tobacco products; . . . or (III) the tobacco 
product or its smoke does not contain or is free of a substance.98  
The statute prohibited the introduction or “deliver[y] for introduction into 
interstate commerce any modified risk tobacco product” without an FDA 
order allowing it to be commercially marketed.99 It also provided that this 
order generally is only permitted if the maker of the product can 
demonstrate the product actually will “(A) significantly reduce harm and 
the risk of tobacco-related disease to individual tobacco users; and (B) 
benefit the health of the population as a whole taking into account both users 
of tobacco products and persons who do not currently use tobacco 
products.”100 
In August 2015, the FDA sent warning letters to Santa Fe Natural 
Tobacco Company and ITG Brands, LLC, stating that the product labels of 
the companies’ Natural American Spirit cigarettes and Winston cigarettes, 
respectively, violated this statute.101 Specifically, the Natural American 
Spirit labeling described the cigarettes as “Natural” and “Additive Free” and 
the Winston labeling described the cigarettes as “Additive Free” without 
FDA orders permitting such marketing.102 The letters alleged that this 
labeling “represents explicitly and/or implicitly that the products or their 
smoke do not contain or are free of a substance and/or that the products 
present a lower risk of tobacco-related disease or are less harmful than . . . 
other commercially marketed tobacco products.”103 The letters also 
recognized that the earlier consent orders that were entered into with the 
FTC in 2000 permitted the labels as long as they contained the disclosure, 
discussed above, that no additives doesn’t mean the cigarette is safer.104 
 
98. 21 U.S.C. § 387k(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
99. 21 U.S.C. § 387k(a) (2012). 
100. 21 U.S.C. § 387k(g)(1) (2012). 
101. FDA Warning Letter to Michael Little, President, Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company, Inc. 
(Aug. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Santa Fe Warning Letter], https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-en 
forcement-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/santa-fe-natural-tobacco-company-inc-0827201 
5 [https://perma.cc/3TK9-RV9U]; FDA Warning Letter to David Taylor, Chief Executive Officer, ITG 
Brands, LLC (Aug. 27, 2015) [hereinafter ITG Brands Warning Letter], https://www.fda.gov/inspection 
s-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/warning-letters/itg-brands-llc-475193-0827201 
5 [https://perma.cc/7VRA-58ES]. 
102. Santa Fe Warning Letter, supra note 101; ITG Brands Warning Letter, supra note 101. 
103. Santa Fe Warning Letter, supra note 101; ITG Brands Warning Letter, supra note 101. 












However, the letters noted that those consent decrees predated the Tobacco 
Control Act, which gave the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products.105 
In January 2017, Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company reached an 
agreement with the FDA, resolving the issues raised in the warning letter.106 
As part of the agreement, the company agreed to remove the terms 
“Additive Free” and “Natural” from its Natural American Spirit product 
labels, labeling, advertising, and promotional materials.107 Similarly, in 
September 2017, the FTC sent a closeout letter to ITG Brands stating that 
ITG Brands had sufficiently addressed the issues raised in the FDA’s 
warning letter.108  
Like the FTC years earlier, the FDA understood labels and 
advertisements touting cigarettes as being “additive-free” to be falsely 
representing that they are safer than other cigarettes, even if no health claim 
is explicitly made. The FDA, however, took a stronger approach than the 
FTC, prohibiting these labels and advertisements rather than just requiring 
a disclaimer of the erroneous implication. 
IV. POSSIBLE REGULATORY APPROACHES 
This article argues that advertisements and labels that exploit erroneous 
pre-existing beliefs are deceptive. However, there are multiple possible 
regulatory approaches to this problem. The best approach depends in large 
part on whether the highlighted characteristic is relevant to consumers or 
investors only because of the erroneous belief or because of other, legitimate 
reasons as well. 
A. Highlighted Characteristic Relevant Only Because of Erroneous Belief 
Some product characteristics that are highlighted in advertisements or on 
labels would be relevant only to consumers or investors who have erroneous 
 
105. Santa Fe Warning Letter, supra note 101; ITG Brands Warning Letter, supra note 101. 
106. Memorandum of Agreement between FDA and RAI Services Company/Santa Fe Natural 
Tobacco Company, Inc. (Jan. 19, 2017). 
107. Id. The agreement, however, permitted the company to continue to use the term “Natural” in 
its “Natural American Spirit” brand name and trademarks. Id. 
108. FDA Closeout Letter to David Taylor, Chief Executive Officer, ITG Brands, LLC (Sept. 5, 
2017), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/warning-
letters/itg-brands-llc-close-out-letter-9517 [https://perma.cc/M2AL-BVJU]. The terms of the Santa Fe 
Natural Tobacco Company’s agreement with the FDA resolving the issues raised in the FDA’s warning 
letter were made public because the agreement was disclosed in another civil case. FDA/Santa Fe 
Natural Tobacco Agreement Fails to Protect the Public from Misleading Claims and Imagery on Natural 
American Spirit Cigarettes, CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.tobaccof 
reekids.org/press-releases/2017_03_02_fda [https://perma.cc/KE9N-NHS5]. In contrast, how ITG 
Brands addressed the FDA’s concerns has not been made public, but it is reasonable to speculate that 
ITG Brands took an approach similar to Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company’s. 











beliefs regarding the characteristics. For example, a particular equity mutual 
fund’s high past returns should be irrelevant to investors unless they 
erroneously believe that strong past returns are a good predictor of strong 
future returns.  
One regulatory approach would be to require such advertisements or 
labels to disclaim the erroneous belief. Indeed, the SEC takes such an 
approach regarding mutual fund performance advertisements. As discussed 
above, the SEC requires these advertisements to contain a disclaimer 
informing investors that  
past performance does not guarantee future results; that the 
investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate 
so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or 
less than their original cost; and that current performance may be 
lower or higher than the performance data quoted.109  
A good argument exists, however, for a stronger approach: prohibiting 
the highlighting of such a product characteristic, rather than just requiring a 
disclaimer of the erroneous belief. People will only consider useful the 
information that the product has the highlighted characteristic if they hold 
the erroneous belief regarding the characteristic’s relevance, e.g., investors 
will not care that a particular fund has had high returns unless they believe 
that high past returns are a good predictor of high future returns. Thus, 
highlighting such a product characteristic has no purpose except to 
encourage people to adopt and act upon the erroneous belief. As a result, 
these advertisements provide no useful information and can cause harm by 
misleading people and wasting resources.110 Prominent legal scholars have 
argued that prohibiting certain advertising claims that provide little, if any, 
value to consumers can be justified.111 Because these advertisements can 
cause harm but provide no benefit, they should be prohibited.  
An advantage of prohibiting these advertisements is that an effective 
disclaimer of the erroneous belief need not be developed. This is beneficial 
because creating an effective disclaimer can be very difficult. Recall the 
experiment finding evidence that the current SEC-mandated warning in 
performance advertisements, which discourages investors from relying on a 
 
109. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(b)(3)(i) (2018). 
110. See supra Section II. 
111. See, e.g., Beales et al., supra note 43, at 496, 534 (“[E]nforcement costs aside—there is no 
reason not to forbid” claims that “contribute nothing to consumer welfare.” “[I]n some instances the 
truthful information conveyed by a claim . . . may be of so little value that there is no reason to preserve 
it by permitting the claim.”); see also Richard Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 549, 584 (1991) (noting that “if nothing would be lost by 












fund’s past returns, is ineffective.112 Although the same experiment also 
demonstrated that a stronger warning could be effective,113 there is reason 
to be skeptical that it would be so in real-world situations. For any 
disclaimer to be effective, it has to be seen, read, understood, and believed. 
In that experiment, participants were explicitly asked to read the 
advertisement and then answer questions about it. People who, in real-life 
situations, only happen to come across an advertisement in a magazine, for 
example, might just skim the advertisement and not read a disclaimer in it 
as closely as participants in the experiment did.114  
This conclusion is supported by other research, which demonstrates the 
difficulty of creating disclaimers that are effective even in experimental 
settings. For example, as discussed above, until recently, cigarette 
companies could use advertisements and labels stating that the cigarettes 
were “additive-free” as long as they also included a short and clear 
disclaimer that additive-free tobacco does not mean a safer cigarette.115 An 
experiment found, however, that even when consumers likely focused on 
the advertisement longer in the experiment than they would in the real 
world, the disclaimer had only a small effect.116 In other words, the 
advertising claim that a cigarette was additive-free was “much more potent 
in the extent to which [it] reduced perceived harm [of the cigarettes] than 
disclaimers were in undoing this deception.”117 Consumers continued to 
believe erroneously that additive-free cigarettes were safer than regular 
cigarettes.118 
Further, imagine that a disclaimer were created and mandated that 
actually caused people to completely disregard the advertised product 
characteristic. Given that advertising is expensive and label space is 
valuable, it would be irrational for companies to highlight a product 
characteristic that a disclaimer had convinced people was irrelevant. Thus, 
advertisers would likely stop advertising the characteristic or devoting label 
 
112. Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 73, at 449, 451–53. 
113. Id. at 449, 453, 457. That stronger warning stated, “Do not expect the fund’s quoted past 
performance to continue in the future. Studies show that mutual funds that have outperformed their peers 
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chance.” Id. at 445. 
114. See Baig et al., supra note 86, at 938 (“We suspect that [compared to the impact of advertising 
disclaimers in an experimental setting] the relative impact of disclaimers is even weaker in a real-world 
setting in which people would quickly get the gist of the ad from headlines and through repeated 
exposures.”). 
115. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
116. Baig et al., supra note 86, at 936, 938. 
117. Id. at 937. 
118. See Gregory S. Carpenter, Rashi Glazer & Kent Nakamoto, Meaningful Brands from 
Meaningless Differentiation: The Dependence on Irrelevant Attributes, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 339, 
342–47 (1994) (describing experiments using other products that found that consumers can value 
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space to it anyway. In view of this fact, prohibiting the highlighting of the 
characteristic would be a more direct way of achieving the same outcome.  
One possible objection to prohibiting these advertisements and labels is 
that it seems inconsistent to prohibit highlighting a product characteristic 
that is actually legally required to be disclosed elsewhere. For example, food 
and drug labels are required to list the ingredients of the food or drug.119 
Thus, anyone who reads the ingredient list can see that it contains or lacks 
a particular ingredient. Why then should companies be prohibited from 
highlighting that fact? Similarly, a mutual fund’s prospectus—which must 
be made available to investors before they invest in the fund—is required to 
provide the fund’s past returns.120 Consequently, why should fund 
companies be prohibited from advertising that same information? 
These apparent inconsistencies should not be troublesome, however. An 
ingredient list on a product label lists all of the product’s ingredients, and a 
mutual fund’s prospectus contains detailed information about many aspects 
of the fund.121 Consumers and investors who do not read ingredient lists and 
prospectuses carefully, if at all, might not even notice a particular product 
characteristic. In contrast, an advertisement or label that touts that the 
antacid is “aluminum-free” highlights the absence of one ingredient 
(aluminum), and a mutual fund performance advertisement highlights a 
fund’s high past returns, making these characteristics very difficult to miss.  
In addition, it is reasonable to suspect that consumers who read 
ingredient lists on labels, and investors who read fund prospectuses, are 
more sophisticated than people who would buy a product after only glancing 
at its label, or who would invest in a fund after reading little more than a 
performance advertisement. Thus, consumers who read ingredient lists and 
investors who read fund prospectuses might need less protection than do 
people who only become aware of a particular product characteristic 
because it is highlighted on a label or in an advertisement.  
Finally, as discussed above, labels and advertisements that highlight a 
particular product characteristic imply that that characteristic should be 
important to a purchase or investment decision.122 In contrast, an ingredient 
list or mutual fund prospectus that contains other information does not 
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returns). 
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imply that one particular ingredient or a fund’s past returns should be more 
important to the consumer or investor than are the product’s other 
ingredients or the fund’s other characteristics. Thus, a label or advertisement 
highlighting a particular characteristic probably is more likely to entice 
people to make purchases or investments based on that highlighted 
characteristic than is an ingredient list or a prospectus. 
B. Highlighted Characteristic Also Relevant for Legitimate Reason 
A more complex regulatory issue arises when some consumers or 
investors have erroneous pre-existing beliefs about a particular product 
characteristic that is relevant for another, legitimate reason. For example, 
many consumers erroneously believe that cigarettes that lack chemical 
additives are safer than other cigarettes.123 However, many of the 
advertisements for additive-free cigarettes cited in the FTC’s complaints 
claimed that they tasted better and/or lasted longer.124 Assuming that such 
cigarettes actually do taste better and last longer,125 being additive-free is a 
characteristic about which some consumers have incorrect pre-existing 
beliefs but that is also relevant to some consumers for legitimate reasons. 
When some consumers erroneously believe that a product characteristic 
is relevant for one reason, but the characteristic is truly relevant for other 
reasons, prohibiting highlighting the characteristic in advertisements or 
labels can be problematic. Although such a prohibition would likely prevent 
some consumers from being misled, it also would deprive consumers of 
useful information.126 For example, prohibiting cigarettes from being 
advertised as being “additive-free” would help prevent consumers from 
being deceived into buying the advertised cigarettes for health reasons, but 
it would also harm consumers who correctly believed, or could be 
convinced, that additive-free cigarettes tasted better or lasted longer.  
One possible regulatory approach to address this concern would be to 
allow the highlighting of the product characteristic, but require the 
advertisement or label to also disclose the legitimate reason(s) why the 
highlighted characteristic could be relevant to consumers. For example, an 
advertisement stating that a particular brand of cigarettes is additive-free 
could also be required to state that “additive-free cigarettes taste better and 
 
123. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
124. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
125. Although the FTC challenged the claim that additive-free cigarettes were safer, they did not 
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126. See Janis K. Pappalardo, The Role of Consumer Research in Evaluating Deception: An 
Economist’s Perspective, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 793, 799 (1997) (arguing that before prohibiting a claim 
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last longer than other cigarettes.” In fact, some cigarette manufacturers 
appear to have been at least partly taking this approach even before the FTC 
sued them. Recall that none of the R.J. Reynolds or Santa Fe advertisements 
cited by the FTC claimed that the additive-free cigarettes were healthier, but 
some of them explicitly stated that “[n]o additives in our tobacco means true 
taste, straight up”127 or encouraged consumers to “[d]iscover the slower-
burning, longer-lasting, all-natural smoking experience.”128  
However, this should not be the preferred approach. Although disclosing 
why a characteristic should truly be relevant to consumers might stop the 
advertisement from implying that the false belief is correct, it doesn’t cause 
the advertisement to imply that the false belief is incorrect. In other words, 
the fact that a characteristic makes a product better for one reason doesn’t 
logically exclude it from making the product better for another reason as 
well. For example, even if an advertisement for additive-free cigarettes 
explains that the cigarettes taste better or burn slower than other cigarettes, 
some consumers might still believe that they also are safer. This might be 
especially true for consumers who just skim the advertisement and notice 
that the cigarette is additive-free but do not actually read the disclosure 
stating why that matters.129  
Thus, likely a more effective approach to addressing an erroneous belief 
about the relevance of a product characteristic is to require advertisements 
or labels highlighting the characteristic to also explicitly disclaim the 
erroneous belief. Indeed, this appears to be the approach that had been taken 
by the FTC regarding additive-free cigarettes. Recall that the FTC’s consent 
decrees with three tobacco companies required that their advertisements and 
labels for additive-free cigarettes include a disclaimer that “[n]o additives 
in our tobacco does NOT mean a safer cigarette”130 even though the 
challenged advertisements by two of the companies explicitly claimed only 
that additive-free cigarettes taste better or last longer. There is no indication 
that the consent decrees forbade the companies from continuing to claim 
that additive-free cigarettes are superior for non-health reasons; they were 
just required to disclaim that the cigarettes were healthier. 
As discussed above, however, creating truly effective disclaimers is 
difficult. Thus, if the likelihood of deception and the harm from being 
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deceived are high compared to the value of the highlighted information in 
the advertisement, then prohibiting highlighting the characteristic could still 
make sense. Consequently, the FDA’s apparent prohibition on advertising 
or labeling cigarettes as additive-free might be justified even if this 
prohibition deprives consumers of the useful information that additive-free 
cigarettes last longer and/or taste better than other cigarettes.  
Further, such a prohibition need not completely deprive consumers of 
this useful information. For example, brands of additive-free cigarettes 
could still be advertised as longer-lasting, if that is true. The advertisements, 
however, would not be permitted to provide the reason that they are longer 
lasting: they lack chemical additives. Such a limitation, however, might 
make the advertisements less effective because consumers probably are 
more likely to believe that the cigarettes are longer-lasting or better-tasting 
if they are given the reason (i.e., that they are additive-free).131 Nevertheless, 
the public health benefit of preventing consumers from being misled about 
the safety of additive-free cigarettes might justify the loss of this 
information. 
CONCLUSION 
Many consumers and investors erroneously believe that certain product 
characteristics make the products superior. Advertisements and labels that 
highlight those characteristics exploit those pre-existing beliefs. These 
advertisements and labels are misleading even if they don’t explicitly state 
that the product characteristics make the products better; the highlighting 
inherently implies that the characteristics make the products superior. Thus, 
these advertisements or labels can be deceptive even if they don’t mention 
the pre-existing beliefs. In addition, they can deceive even people who have 
no prior beliefs regarding the highlighted characteristics. 
Several possible regulatory approaches exist regarding these 
advertisements and labels. The strongest and most effective approach is to 
prohibit them. This approach is best if no reason exists that the characteristic 
actually does make the product superior. In that case, the prohibition helps 
prevent deception while not depriving consumers or investors of useful 
information. 
If, however, there is also a legitimate reason for highlighting the 
characteristic then a softer regulatory approach might be appropriate. At 
 
131. See Trevor Marchant, The Most Persuasive Tool in Advertising, MEDIUM (Oct. 30, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@TREVORMARCHANT/the-most-persuasive-tool-in-advertising-3c8eb5a0ce54 
[https://perma.cc/628X-FZ6F] (emphasizing importance that advertisements explain why the advertised 
product is superior to competitors’ and giving example of a soda advertisement claiming that the soda 
tastes better because it contains 10 percent fruit juice).  











least a disclosure of the legitimate reason should be required. Still, a 
stronger, and likely more effective approach is to require an explicit 
disclaimer of the false belief. However, creating an effective disclaimer is 
difficult. Thus, when the likelihood of deception and the harm from being 
deceived is high relative to the benefit from the highlighted information, 
prohibiting highlighting the product characteristic might still be justified. 
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